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There are few questions relating to contemporary public
affairs more puzzling, and more fundamentally disturbing,
than that of whetber Western political forms and ideals are
appropriate or even relevant for the new states. The most
ardent believer in Western liberal democracy is likely to
hesitate and even qualify his faith when considering the
extent to which representative institutions and the democratic
ethos are exportable to the underdeveloped portions of the
world. And on the other side, statesmen and intellectuals
in the transitional societies demonstrate in countless ways
their unsureness of how complete their commitment to demo-
cratic practices should begiven the problem of their societies.
These questions and doubts were rarely openly expressed
a decade and a half ago when Southeast Asia was serving as
the first proving grounds for the transferral of power from
colonial to national hands. Since then the spirit of opti-
mism which accompanies the birth of new nations is to be
found in modified form mainly in Africa; in Southeast Asia
the passing of time has raised the level of uncertainty and
2perplexity, if not pessimism. The record clearly shows that
the ending of the colonial epoch set into motion great ex-
pectations but little performance. In the meantime, latent
doubts and anxieties have gradually come to the fore, and
now the regions seem to be in the profound grip of uncertainty.
Both outside observers and those who would be the spokes-
men of these underdeveloped countries seem to have disturbingly
little confidence as to what should be the content of political
development. There is little sense as to what should be
taken as realistic standards of national performance for
transitional peoples. If the early expectations were ex-
aggerated, what now would constitute more appropriate aspira-
tions? Since the leaders in the region are unable to define
the bounds of realistic achievement standards and of appro-
priate political norms, public life in some of the countries
seems to be surrounded in a cloud of excessive hypocricy,
alibies, and pretensions. Yet it is impossible to tell where
the line between rationalizations and legitimate justifications
should run as long as there is universal uncertainty as to
the nature of the nation-building process.
At what pace should a society be able to develop competence
in the management of modern institutions of government? Is
there in the political realm a discernible dynamic process of
3national development which might serve to guide expectations
about the development of particulartountries? What sequence
of trends can be expected in transitional societies? What
interpretations should be placed on such tendencies as the
emergence of authoritarian practices and of military rule?
The rate at which significant questions can pile up begging
for answers suggests the degree to which we lack crucial
knowledge about the processes of political development.
Some Theoretical Considerations
Intellectually the new states of the underdeveloped
areas present a major challenge to Western theorists, There
is no question that contemporary political science was not
adequately prepared to deal with the problems of political
development and nation building. The tremendous advances of
recent years in American political science have generally
followed upon the trend of pushing behind the legal structures
and the formal institutions of government and of taking hard
looks at the realities of political life. The picture of
American politics which has emerged from the vigorous studies
of the clash of parties and interest groups and of the dynamics
of voting behavior have been only of marginal value in prom
viding useful conceptualization about the nature of political
development. Indeed, in a very fundamental sense the model
4which has emerged out of this. tradition of empirical study
of the American political process has been misleading when
applied to most of the new states. For the American scene it
is appropriate to conceive of government structures as repre-
senting the institutionalization of fundamental cultural
and historical patterns of behavior, and to assume further that
the dynamics of the political process consists of pressures
and forces emerging from the broad social and economic bases
of the country, contending with each other, and striving to
shape policy and influence the course of government. Thus
in a sense the "in-puts" of the system come from the society
at large while the "out-puts" are in the form of governmental
policies. Changes in policy outputs alter the condition of
social life, and produce equilibrium adjustments until new
pressures emerge calling for new policies.
In very crude terms this has been the model which has
proved so useful in understanding the American political
process. It is, however, unfortunately of little relevance
for many of the new countries. For in these systems the
source of dynamic change often resides largely within the
formal structures of government, which do not represent the
institutionalization of indigenous cultural patterns but
rather foreign importations. Thus although much of recent
5work on the American political process is of value in
sensitizing scholars to the importance of informal and general
social patterns of behavior, the basic model for analysis has
not been too helpful in advancing our understanding of the
processes of political development and nation building.
Unfortunately, if we turn to the field of comparative
politics we still do not find much help in the problem of a
theory of political development. Until very recently the em-
phasis in comparative government was on analyzing the existing
structures and practices of the major European governments,
with possibly some attention to one or more of the leading
Asian nations. The traditional strength of comparative politics
did not, however, lIe in either explicit comparative analysis
nor in explaining patterns of development and change. In
recent years there has been a significant revitalization of
the field as a result of the compelling need to incorporate
into the study of comparative politics the experiences of the
newly-independent countries. This series of lectures is a
part of this upsurge of interest in the place of the non-
Western world in the study of man's experiences with political
systems.
Theoretical concern with the new countries has taken many
forms depending upon the interests and intellectual styles of
6the analysts. Nearly every approach, however, has either
implicitly or explicitly had to deal with the problem of
categorizing and classifying types of political systems.
The need to establish even the most elementary typologies
stemmed from the fact that there were, first, such manifest
differences between the European political systems of tra-
sitional comparative politics and the new systems of the
underdeveloped regions, and, second, far too many new systems
to be treated on an individual basis. As long as study
centered on a handful of systems of the same cultural areas it
was possible, and indeed advantageous, to concentrate on the
qualities of the particular systems and to avoid generalized
categories.
Once attention was extended to the new states, it immdi-
ately became apparent that discussion could be facilitated by
distinguishing between at a minimum the Western and the non-
Western types of systems. Closer analysis soon revealed
that it was important to distinguish among various types of
non-Western systems, for that category clearly includes
countries at quite different stages of development. At the
same time the increase in the total universe of political
systems being studied made us. more appreciative of signifi-
cant differences among the European or Western systems, and
7thus there has been a greater need to differentiate among the
separate systems with this category.
The sum effect has been an increasing interest in arriving
at typologies of all political systems, but a decline in satis-
faction with the simple dichotomous scheme. The basic trend
seems to be in the direction of an ever-heightening appreciation
of the unique and particularistic qualities of each transitional
system, a trend which has been encouraged by the very strong
sense of cultural relativism basic to the outlook of the con-
temporary generation of American social acientists. The
fundamental problem at the moment which seems to be holding up
the advancement of theory is our uncertainty over what should
be the appropriate general principles for differentiating and
classifying political systems. The difficulty is not that we
lack rigorously defined criteria for building our typologies,
but we seem to be completely unsure of what will prove to be
the most rewarding bases for classification.
In the main it can be said that we are still at the
stage of trying to classify systems as they exist at the
moment. The purpose of such efforts, of course, is to relate
similar types of political systems so that only increased
understanding of the operations of one system will readily
lead to insights about the probable nature of similar ones.
8We are unfortunately not yet in the position to establish
developmental typologies through which we would be able to
hypothesize about how societies are likely to move from one
category to another. This is the problem of the difference
between static and dynamic analysis which is so crucial in
dealing with questions of political development.
Recently there has been increasingly widespread die-
satisfaction over the stress in the social sciences of static
rather than dynamic modes of analysis. There are some very
profound methodological reasons why dynamic theories have
tended to remain at an extremely elementary state which need
not concern us here. It is possibly more significant that
certain intellectual uncertainties and ambivalences which
s pring from the realm of mood and sentiment seem to have
been important handicaps to the development of dynamic theories
about how political systems are likely to change. There
has been, above all, in this field of classifying transitional
political systems a peculiarly intense struggle in the
universal conflict between the particular and the general,
between unique experience and law-like behavior patterns.
This is because this universal problem easily spills over
into the conflict between the spirit of cultural relativism
and the instinct for believing in progress and evolution.
9Cultural relativism rests upon the imperative that all
cultures must be respected for their uniqueness and their
integrity. A recognition of the importance of the distinctive
characteristics of each culture makes it difficult to classify
systems according to limited categories, and particularly in
terms of patterns of changes and degrees of development. In
a very fundamental sense modern social science has been en-
deavoring over the past few decades to escape from .any intel-
lectual association with the Victorian views about progress
and social evolution. Yet suddenly now we find that the
conditions of the new countries compels us to return again
to that old question and to ask ourselves anew whether there
are any general laws of social change and political develop-
ment. We find now that we never really resolved the issues;
we only pushed them out of mind.
To appreciate the problem of social evolution vs cultural
relativism it is necessary first to xamine very briefly some
of the basic assumptions commonly employed in the social
sciences in conceptualizing social change.
Social Roles and SocialCae
One of the great difficulties in attempting to explain
social change and, more specifically, how changes in one
sphere of life are likely to affect the other spheres of the
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society is that we are quickly confronted with questions that
have been largely ignored by the social sciences because they
do not fall readily within the conventional scope of any of
the established disciplines. For example, we do not have
adequate knowledge to define with any confidence the relation-
ship between changes in the pattern of economic behavior and
changes in political behavior. Given our current state of
knowledge, it is impossible to assign any meaningful priorities
of importance to developments in one sphere of life against those
in the other spheres. Even less are we sure whether particular
modes of behavior are likely to be coammicated from one
sphere to another. Is the impact of certain more secular and
more rational forms of organized activities, whether they be
political, economic, or social, likely to produce congruent
developments in all the dimensions of the society it affects?
Or is it more likely that the introduction of new practices
in one fOdd may release counter-forces in other aspects of
the society? What are the necessary conditions to encourage
the one rather than the other?
Possibly one of the reasons why socialscientists have not
directly concerned themselves with such questions is that they
have felt that they already possessed an adequate concept
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which needed only to be refined and made slightly more precise
in order to handle such inter-disciplinary questions. This
concept, which underlies the approach of all the social sciences
to the fundamental nature of human societies, derives from
the view that any society is, in the technical sense, a system
and that thus all the elements within it are interrelated in
such a manner that any change in the character of one will
result in changes in all the others, and the pattern of these
changes can be analyzed both logically and causally. 1
Armed with this concept of society, it was possible for
one to picture any outside influence striking at some parti-
cular aspect of a society and bringing about a change which
would in turn set in motion a chain reaction that would bring
chaiges throughout the system. Moreover, that image was not
limited by the analog of the pebble dropped in a pond because
social scientists have not let themselves be inhibited by
any such principle as the conservation of energy. Instead,
the general practice has been to accept the idea that the
consequent series of changes can far exceed the "energy" of
the initial impact.
1 That is, the pattern of change can be analyzed either in
terms of a theoretical model, constructed on the basis of a
series of definitions and governed by a prescribed system of
logic; or in terms of empirically tracing through the precise
chain of reactions in a particular setting.
In short, we have the .concept that there is a "multiplier
effect" at work in the process of social. change which is similar
to the "multiplier effect" that follows injection of capital
into an economic system, it being generally assumed that in
the case of general social change the multiplier can be of a
much greater magnitude than in the case of an economy. But,
although within the social sciences this concept of society
as a system is widely held, it has not been refined to the
point of providing a basis for systematic analysis. That is
to say, it does not make possible genuine explanations or
predictions but merely provides clues as to past develop-
ments and a feeling of expectation about future ones.
There is a more detailed concept of the social system
which rests upon the idea that all social action can be an
in terms of actors performing according to socially defined
roles. Thus the relationships within the system are role
relationships which are governed by the expectations of the
participants; and, in turn, performance according to the pre"-
scribed roles within any society is maintained by the society-'s
methods of sanctioning and rewarding behavior.
This concept suggests that there is almost no possibility
for change in any closed system. It views change as largely
13
coming from outside the system and therefore, gives great
weight to the impact that comes from exposure to any foreign
society. But it also recognized that change is brought about
by the activities of social deviants, a form of change which
embraces Toynbee's idea of "withdrawal and return" since
in such cases an actor has in some fashion ceased performing
his previous roles and then adopted some new roles which for
a time constitutes deviant behavior. (Intellectuals tend to
have a bias in favor of the innovating character of deviant
behavior for many reasons, not the least of which is a feeling
of antipathy toward the idea of conformity, and a readiness
to place great stock in social importance.)
Although this latter concept provides the two most common
explanations of change within a social system, quite obviously
changes can occur which cannot be so readily explained. This
raises the question as to whether the concept of social systems
based on roles can explain developmental growth within a
closed system.
In large part the difficulty seems to be that in analysis
the practicehas been to describe roles in such idealized terms
as to make them seem far more rigid than is the actual case
in any society. It is often overlooked that even in a closed
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society there is always a significant degree of tolerance
in determining what constitutes acceptable performance of any
social role. This is the case if for no other reason than that
it must be possible for all personality types which the society
judges to be "normal" to perform in an acceptable fashion. It
is true that certain personality types may be strongly attracted
to particular roles and thus color the society's views about
the character of those roles. However, there always remains
a distinction, since the definition of acceptable role behavior
stems primarily from considerations of the function of the role
for the society as a whole and not of its functions for the
personality of the individual.
In overlooking the existence of this tolerance in the
performance of any given role one also overlooks the corollary
that tolerance opens the way for constant changes in the
character of all roles--and, therefore, in the society as a
whole. It seems to us importantthen, to note the factors
which govern change in the character of roles within a closed
society.
First of all, the rewards and punishment employed to
control role performance cannot have the same effect over
time. If the rewards and punishments are kept constant with
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respect to a particular role they will tend to lose their
efficacy. If, on the other hand, changes are made in the
rewards and punishments in order to maintain consistency in
the way a particular role is performed then there must be
changes in the significance of the rewards and punishments used
in controlling other roles. In a sense a society has a
constant problem in allocating the rewards and punishments
at its disposal in such a fashion as to maintain desired
role performance and preventing unacceptable behavior. Con-
sistency in the character of roles is thus impossible.
Secondly, change can follow from the fact that it is
possible to distinguish between excellence and mediocrity in
the performing of any social role. The factor of skill is
particularly significant with respect to those roles associ-
ated with social power, since in all societies power tends to
be agglutinative. Those who gain power in the form of wealth,
for example, tend also to be able to realize other forms of
power such as enlightenment, respectability, the command of
information, and personal association with those possessing
other forms of power.
This relationship of social roles to power tends to lead
to a broadening of the definition of the particular role. The
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result is an expansion of the particular role to the point
that it comes to cover several more specialized forms of activi-
ties whihe may in time come to be recognized as separate and
distinct roles. This phenomenon can be illustrated by what
often occurs with respect to the role of those who are responsible
for relations with the divine in traditional societies. Fre-
quently this role is so sharply defined that members of the
priesthood are prohibited from performing any other generally
accepted roles. The priests may be denied the role of husband
or any role that carries with it control over secular matters
or a close relationship with material things. However, the
development of skill and prestige within the priesthood may
so expand the functions of this limited role as to lead to
the creation of a variety of more specialized roles. For
example, expertness in the study of sacred texts may result
in elements within the priesthood developing skills in inter-
preting the Laws of the Divine which may be recognized as
relevant in handling temporal matters, and thus, gradually
they may come to adopt a role comparable to that of secular
lawyer. Or, for example, the rising prestige of the priest-
hood may result in the accumulation of church property which
may in turn lead elements in the priesthood to act in such a
manner as to create for the society a new role, that of
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managing and maintaining records about property that is not
privately owned.
The proliferation of roles by such internal developments
and the creation of new ones through exposure to outside
systems may result in either greater stability or a serious
disruption of the social system. The possibility of one or
the other development is, indeed, the fundamental question
that confronts us in analyzing the political process in non-
Western societies. Will innovation result in a more efficient
social system so that social goals can be more effectively
sought, or will the social order be so damaged as to hamper
purposeful action?
When we move from these concepts of social change to
the political problems of non-Western societies it becomes
apparent that the objective of achieving a purposeful develop-
ment depends upon the creation of a new system of roles. This
in turn depends upon, first, the currently influential elements
in those societies having some appreciation of what the appro-
priate new roles should be, and, second, the effective use
of rewards and punishments in institutionalizing these new
roles. Change will continue in those societies, but in a
random fashion, if there is not a concerted effort to channel
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the direction of change toward the establishment of the desired
system of new roles.
Some Problems of Politically Directed Chgbse in Non-Western
Societies
For our purposes we may visualize the situation in non-
Western societies as one in which new elites, operating in
terms of new roles, are striving to alter the total social
system in predetermined directions. The leaders of most of
these countries have committed themselves to the establikh-
ment of Westernized forms of government and to the encourage-
ment of more modern practices throughout their. societies.
Before turning to the specific character of the political
process within which these elites must act, it is possible to
distinguish two critical problems that are directly related
to the nature of the social system. The first of these prob-
lems involves the question of how the leadership may divide
its efforts in seeking to encourage desired changes in
social roles. The second concerns the availability of re-
sources for inducing people to adopt new roles in non-Western
societies.
In a general sense, the leadership in those societies
is faced with the problem of dividing its effort between
developing more skill in performing elite roles and so creating
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a viable system of intra-elite relations and striving to
effect mass behavior so as to establish a total social system
based on new patterns of role relationships. Some of the
peculiar characteristics of the political process in non-
Western societies encourage the national leadership to devote
almost all its energies to intr-elite activities. Considerable
attention to such activities is, indeed, necessary if an
effective leadership is to emerge. However, the task of
creating a new system of elite relations can be easily con-
fused with that of reconstituting the total social system,
especially since it can be personally rewarding and extremely
exciting for the participants. On the other hand, if the
elite directs its energies entirely toward influencing the
behavior of the masses, it may soon dissipate its strength
and lose its position of leadership. Much of the criticism
of elite behavior in non-Western societies overlooks the fact
that, unless there is a viable system of intra-elite role
relationships that can provide a genuine basis of unity, the
attempt to bring about a new system of relationships on the
part of the masses is likely to create divisions within the
elite and thus destroy the very basis of national unity.
There is a problem here too complicated to be solved
merely by the appropriate allocation of resources to the two
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areas of elite action. A fundamental difficulty is that in
any system the forces of disorganization will prove to be
superior to those supporting the organization of the system
unless new energies are introduced on the side of order. This
is to say that within a social system there is a phenomenon
comparable to that of entrophy within any physical system.
We were alluding to this problem when we suggested that if
the rewards and punishments used to maintain role performance
are kept constant they will lose their effectiveness over time.
Any system will thus "run down" if constant effort is not made
to maintain it. This means that in the non-Western societies
the elite is working against the odds since they not only have
to oppose the inertia of the traditional system and the random
developments that stem from the indirect pattern of social
change but must also constantly devote energies to maintaining
their own intra-elite system.
The second major problem is the serious shortage of
resources available to the elites who are seeking to control
the pattern of, social change. As we have indicated the "energy"
for changing or maintaining role behavior in a social system
consists of rewards and punishments. The fact that most non-
Western societies are poor countries places certain material
limits on the rewards that can be given to those who accept
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new roles. Generally the leaders of those courtries tend to
rely upon three forms of rewards: (1) exhortations and
praise, (2) salaries within a bureaucratic 8tructure, and
(3) admission to the society of the elite.
Exhortations and praise are of limited value as rewards
except in encouraging people to accept new roles, since they
can influence only those who already see some advantage in
accepting the new roles. Likewise, salaries are more effect-
ive in maintaining a system than in encouraging the adoption
of new roles. And, of course, the virtues of a bureaucratic
arrangement are not those related to the encouragement of
innovation.
Admission to the ranks of the elite appears to be the
most effective method of rewards in most non-Western societies.
However, it is also a method that has its limitations in
creating a new social system. If admission to the ranks of
the elite is made too easy, the system of intra-elite relations
can be disrupted and the position of the elite will be under-
mined. Even more important is the fact that it is not a
method well designed to encourage the adoption of new roles
of a non-elite character. Indeed, it is all too common in
non-Western societies for people trained to perform general
roles in the society to find that greater rewards lie in
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seeking admission to the ranks of the elite and ignoring
their specialized training. Thus, for example, the man
trained to be, say, a modern engineer may feel that he can
obtain greater rewards by becoming a member of the elite per-
forming an administrative role than by applying his newly-
learned skills in the general society.
There is another important reason why the method of
encouraging new roles by rewards is seriously limited in
most non-Western societies. The presence of social sanctions
to maintain the existing roles within any society means that
the rewards for innovating new roles must appear to some
people to be substantially greater than the risks involved
in defying convention. In most societies those who create new
roles for themselves face at least the charges of "immoral"
and "corrupt" behavior if not more severe sanctions. The
difficulty in most non-Western societies is that in addition
to the restraints which still exist in terms of the traditional
society, the modernized elite has accepted standards common
to current Western society in which innovation has been insti-
tutionalized and massive rewards are no longer essential, and
hence viewed as socially undesirable. Thus the elites in most
non-Western societies are explicitly opposed to anyone in
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their societies receiving rewards comparable to those avail-
able to the individuals who risked innovating the necessary
roles in creating industrial development in the West. Rather,
they generally take their ethics from a relatively stable
Western system in which the rewards of "social service" are
meaningful.
Thus most non-Western societies are doubly conservative
with respect to rewards for inducing new role performance.
In addition to the restraint of the traditional system there
is an elite that is seeking change and has adopted a conserva-
tive attitude with respect to rewards even when it is committed
to programs that are radical not only in terms of their own
societies but even in terms of the West. The result is a
very slim margin within which rewards can operate to effect
changes in role behavior, This suggests that the fundamental
question in some non-Western countries is not whether they can
achieve rapid industrialization within a democratic framework
but rather whether they can do it within such a framework and
at the same time limit themselves in stimulating motivation
for innovating roles to mere salaries and nationalistic exhorta-
tions.
In contrast to the limitations on rewards, there is wide
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flexibility in the range of punishment in most non-Western
societies since, in general, there is no inherent limitation
in the availability of sanctions except the efficiency of
administrative controls. This situation, reinforced by the
authoritarian qualities comon to most traditional societies,
encourages even elites seeking to establida liberal-democratic
systems to employ repressive measures. Thus, inescapably,
in most non-Western societies the scales are weighted in
favor of punishment rather than reward. Here again, the
democratic leaders of non-Western countries are working
against heavy odds.
Evolution and Relatively Isolated Cultures
It is appropriate to return again to the conflict be-
tween cultural relativism and social evolution. We have
already gone beyond the point of the degree to which isolated
systems can be expected to generate change and we are entering
into the problems of change as a consequcne of contacts be-
tween cultures and the diffusion of cultural traits. We
must now make a telling observation which is basic to under-
standing our difficulties in theorizing about political develop-
ment in the new states: the fundamental outlook of comparative
politics has been that of treating the development of each
political system as separate and largely autonomous entities,
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and the objective of evolutionary theories has been to arrive
at laws which would explain the stages of growth of relatively
autonomous political organisms, and yet the burden of empirical
evidence is entirely on the side of relating significant
social change to cultural diffusion which is always independent
of the time factor. This is to say that attempts to theorize
about the progressive stages of development of relatively
isolated systems represent a gross misapplication of effort.
It would be useful at this point to quote at some length
the anthropologist Robert H. Lovie at the conclusion of his
classic study of social organization Primitive Society:
The belief in social progress was a natural accompani-
ment of the belief in historical laws, especially when
tinged with the evolutionary optimism of the 'seventies
of the nineteenth century. If inherent necessity urges
all societies along a fixed path, metaphysicians may
still dispute whether the underlying force be divine or
diabolic, but there can at least be no doubt as to which
community is retarded and which accelerated in its move-
ment toward the appointed goal. But no such necessity
or design appears from the study of culture history.
Cultures develop mainly through the borrowings due to
chance contact. Our own civilization is even more largely
than the rest a complex of borrowed traits. The singolar
order of events by which it has come into being provides
no schedule for the itinerary of alien cultures. Hence
the specious plea that a given people must pass through
such or such a stage in our history before attaining
this or that destinationcan no longer be sustained.
1. Robert H. Lovie, Primitive Society, originally published
in 1920 by Horace Liveright, reprinted by Harper Torchbooks,
New York, 1961. pp. 440-41.
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Lowie reminds us also of the profound words of the
jurist Maitland in Domesday Book and Beyond which he quotes:
Even had our anthropologists at their command material
that would justify them in prescribing that every indepen-
dent portion of mankind must, if it is to move at all,
move through one fated series of stages which may be
designated as Stage A, Stage B, Stage C, and so forth,
we still should have to face the fact that the rapidly
progressive groups have been just those which have not
been independent, which have not worked out their own
salvation, but have appropriated alen ideas and have thus
been enabled, for anything that we can tell, to leap from
Stage A to Stage X without passing through any intermediate
stages. Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors did not arrive at the
alphabet or at the Nicene Creed, by traversing a long
series of 'stages'; they leapt to the one and to the
other. 1
There is considerable danger that in the light of the pressing
policy problems of development in the new states people will
come to think inczeasingly of all human societies as organic
entities with very definite patterns of growth. This is es-
pecially likely to be the case as we tend more and more to
apply shorthand terminology to different ranges of policy
problems and thus to speak of country A as being at such and
such a stage of development and country B at another stage. We
shall be shortly noting why such ways of classification may be
appropriate for considering policy matters. At this point we
must make very clear the conviction that we have no solid in-
tellectual grounds to justify the notion that all societies
1. Ibid., p. 435.
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must or are likely to pass through discernible and historically
progressive stages of evolution.
As long as we are concerned with the pattern of change in
individual societies it is almost impossible to speak of stages
of development while avoiding the pitfall of teleological
reasoning. To assume that the histories of the new states will
parallel the experiences of the industrial countries is not to
replace static analysis with a dynamic approachi it is to in-
dulge in a glorified form of ethnocentrism.
It is true that many respected philosophers of history and
students of civilization have postulated that societies have
life cycles which follow discernible laws. Basic to the thinking
of such different men as Marx, Toynbee, and Spengler, has been
a common effort to elucidate the sequences of growth, develop-n
ment and decline of human societies. And certainly the founders
of modern sociology were intensely interested in the problem of
social evolution. Max Weber, in seeking to explain the industrial
revolution in Europe, formulated the evolutionary patterns of
changes in forms of authority in which the traditional system
gave way to the charismatic, and then if developmefnt continued,
there would emerge the rational-legal form of authority. 1
1. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,
trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Glencoe, Ill., The
Free Press, 1947.
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Auguste Comte also formulated a three stage progression of
social evolution: the theological, the metaphysical, and the
positivist periods. 1 And of course there are many others who
have sought to find some historical order in the experiences of
societies and civilizations. For our purposes it is not necessary
to evaluate all of these efforts; it is sufficient to recognize
that these authors have been dealing with units of human history
which are far larger both in terms of cultural areas and historical
time than the relatively modest units which are represented by
the new states of the underdeveloped areas. Whatever the merits
of any particular theory about the rise and fall of civilization,
they are not likely to be manifest when applied to the situation
in the various new states.
he Nation State Systen and the Diffusion of a World Culte
Our contention has been that change is an open-ended
process, so long as societies axe conceived of as isolated
systems with only intermittent and random contacts with other
systems. We are also suggesting that most attempts to theorize
about the processes of social and political change have been
largely in terms of such autonomous systems. Even among some
authors who have acknowledged the crucial role of outside influence
1. Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy, trans. by Harriet
Martineau, London, George Bell and Sons, 1896.
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in generating change there is still the tendency to try to mute
the role of diffusion and to search for laws internal to the
social system to explain the course of social and political
development.
In turning our backs upon the possibility of discovering any
set laws which might govern recognizable stages of development,
we are not necessarily driven to the conclusion that there is no
order or pattern behInd the direction of change in the underdeveloped
areas. The theoretical nature of our problem changes fundamentally
when we recognize that the present-day question of political
development in the new states is directly connected to an historical
epoch, and therefore our search should not be for universal laws
about the ultimate direction of social development but rather
for a clearer understanding of how the contemporary forces at work
in the world are likely to effect the particular experiences of
the currently underdeveloped countries. Instead of the historic
pattern of random and haphazard contacts among cultures, of nomads
meeting agriculturalists, seafarers meeting and trading with land-
based peoples, and of adventurers, wanderers, pilgrims and soldiers,
and of each rubbing off a bit of its culture on the other; we now
live at a time in which there is massive diffusion of culture which
is almost entirely moving in one direction,
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When the European world first pressed outward and learned of
the worlds of Africa and Asia there was some basis of mutuality
in the contacts. It would have been hard at the time of these
first contacts to have predicted how the interchange of cultural
contacts would have .affected each side. But at an ever4accelerating
rate the direction and the volume of cross-cultural influences
has become nearly a uniform pattern of the Western industrial
world imposing its practices, standards, techniques, and values
upon the non-Western world. -
This massive, essentially one-way flow of cultural diffusion
is most clearly manifest in the political realm. The development
of the nation-state is only in part an autonomous, domestic
process, for all states are shaped in very fundamental ways by
the fact that they are units of a nation-state system and they
are constantly called upon to interact with that system. Indeed,
the nation-state has little meaning in isolation, and all the
concepts basic to the operations and organization of the modern
nation-state are derived from the standards common to the inter-
national community. It would take us well beyond the scope of our
present analysis to elaborate in detail the essential nature of
the nation-state system and the ways in which this system compels
all societies that would be sovereign entities to adopt certain
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forms of public institutions. It is enough to note that starting
from the problems of defense and foreign policy and carrying over
into the fields of membership in the United Nations and the control
of international trade and commerce and on into the realm of the
domestic management of affairs there are a host of very explicit
pressures which press govermuents in certain very definite directions.
There is of course always considerable latitude as to the
particular institutional forms of government--whether for example
a state will have a presidential or a cabinet form of executive
authority--and also there can be considerable variations as to the
organization of the polity and the spirit of the political culture--
whether there are few or many political parties and whether there
is an open or closed political process. We shall shortly be
returning to these possibilities for variations. At the moment,
however, we must stress that there are certain minimum qualifica-
tions of statehood in the international community which do place
demands upon the development of all nation-states. We must also
recognize that these pressures go beyond just those related to
the functional needs of the nation-state system as a whole and
reflect what we might call the cultural climate of that system.
That is to say that there is also what we may call a "world" or
a "cosmopolitan" culture which is closely related to the nation-
state system.
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Just as the nation'state system reflects in numerous ways
its historical origins in the European cultural area, so too
does this world culture encompass much of Western civilization.
However both the system and the culture have in the last three
hundred years increasingly spread outward to engulf the entire
world, and thus it is appropriate to speak of both as world
rather than Western or European systems and cultures.
We cannot dwell here on the content of the world culture; it
is sufficient to observe that it does have a degree of inner
coherence and it is generally recognized as being the essence
of makrn life. It is based upon a secular rather than a sacred
view of human relations, a rational outlook, an acceptance of the
entire substance and spirit of the scientific approach, a vigorous
application of an expanding technology, an industrialized organi-
zation of production, and generally humanistic and popularistic
set of values for political life.
Once we recognize the demands and the attractions of both
the nation-state system and the world culture we can begin to
appreciate the basic stresses which must underlie the nation-
building process in the new states. We can now see why there is
no escaping from our initial questions as to the relevance of what
we first called Western institutions to the underdeveloped countries.
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Up to a point all societies must adjust to the historical facts
of our era and they must adopt their economies, societies, and
polities to the world system and the world culture. Thus we can
see that the underdeveloped coutries can only up to a very narrow
degree reject, first, their own historical experiences in being
introduced into the world community, and second, their continuing
need to preserve their identity and sovereignty in the world
community of states.
All of this is to say that there is a minimum level of what
were once Western but are now world standards which the new states
must accept. And there is also a general direction that national
development must follow.
The Process of Acculturation to the Modern World
There remains, however, the great variety of ways in which
separate societies may be acculturated to the world systems and
the world culture. The problems of nation-building are thus
directly related to the dynamics of this acculturation process,
and not to any form of natural evolution or organic change in
autonomous systems.
Those features of the acculturation process which are
peculiar to each non-Western society are generally related to the
characteristics of their particular traditional cultures and the
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conditions under which they were exposed to the West.
There are, of course, significant differences in the character
of traditional societies. In some the traditional order represented
great civilizations with elaborate patterns of social relations;
in others it consisted of relatively primitive peasant communities
with no written traditions. Each type of traditional society,
therefore, has its distinctive basis for response to the Western im-
pact. To go further than this general observation and determine
which aspects of traditional life have persisted in a given non-
Western society and to explain why they have maintained a dynamic
quality is beyond the scope of this paper. We can, however,
make certain observations with respect to the Western impact which
has come to the traditional societies in a variety of ways.
First, there were differences in the auspices under which
Western influences were introduced. In some instances it was
traceable primarily to the activities of private Western individuals
and organizations; in others the agent was Western rule in the form
of colonialism; in still others the Western impact was mediated
through an indigenous elite .
Secondly, there are the differences in the spheres of life
which were most immediately affected by Western influences.
Colonialism operated directly at the level of government, Other
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forms of Western influence primarily affected commerce, education,
or religion.
Thirdly, there have been great differences in the intensity
and the direction of the Western impact. Some traditional societies
have been exposed to the West over long periods of time but the
intensity of the exposure has been relatively low. In others
the Western challenge has been an intense one over only a brief
span.1
Fourthly, there are differences in the degree of violence
which accompanied the most intensive Western impacts. In Southeast
Asia the more gradual and less violent process of change was
suddenly and abruptly altered by the Second World War and the
period of Japanese occupation. Elsewhere non-Western societies
have been spared the more violent impacts of the modern world.
At the heart of the acculturation process in all transitional
societies lies an inherent conflict between the need for order
and the need for continuing change. The diffusion of the world
culture is fundamentally disruptive of all traditional forms of
social organization. At the same time, however, the process of
diffusion demands that societies maintain the necessary degree of
order so as to prevent the disruption of the international system
1. This discussion follows the line of analysis of the character
of non-Western societies and their exposure to the West in:
George MeT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker, and Lucian W. Pye, "Comparative
Politics of Non-Western Countries," American Political Science
Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, December, 1955, pp. 1022-1041.
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and of those domestic systems essential for supporting aspects
of the world culture. We could cite countless illustrations of
how these two requirements of order and change create ddstructive
internal tensions. Modernization, for example, may force a dis-
ruption of the traditional family system while at the same time
requiring the establishment of modern educational systems; yet
the very weakening of the family system may so affect the
socialization process as to make it difficult if not impossible
for the youth of the society to perform effectively in the edu-
cational system.
Similarly, modernization may require a weakening of village
forms of social organization and the establishment of more
industrialized organizations, yet the very process of concentrating
populations in new urban centers may produce so many psychological
insecurities that the result is not a reliable labor force but
explosive mobs of people.
Political Instability and the Piocess of Social Change
The state of equilibrium between order and change is thus
critical in determining the political condition in any transitional
society at any particular moment.
In this context we would note first that the essence of
political stability is that it is a requirement for the realization
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of directed and purposeful change, since it connotes a public
policy which effectively reflects and satisfies the changing scheme
of values within a society. In direct contrast, political instability
connoted a public policy either too rigid and inflexible to
accomodate the changing balance of values in the society or
too vacillating and unsure to be able to advance any objectives.
Thus, political stability can be associated with change that is
rationally directed toward satisfying the social needs of the
maximum possible proportion of the population, while instability
is associated with change that fails to gratify the social demands
of the people and leaves an increasing proportion frustrated.
Secondly, we would note that the dynamic factor in creating
tension has generally been the uneven and discontinuous process
of social change in the direction of greater urbanization, for it
seems that in transitional societies the rate of urban growth has
far outstripped the rate of industrial and economic development
which is the functional basis of the modern city. People have
chosen the life of the city even when they cannot find there
the functions usually associated with a modern city, a development
which demonstrates that individuals can become acculturated to a
modern way of life far more readily than societies can be re-
organized.
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The connection between the general principle of the
relationship between political stability and social change and
the fact of uneven and discontinuous social change in the
transitional societies is demonstrated clearly by the case of
the highly trained Asian who finds that he cannot apply his
new knowledge and skills in his underdeveloped society. It
is similarly demonstrated by the less educated person who
has turned to the city in search of a more exciting and richer
life and cannot find activities to which he can hitch his
ambitions. It is plain that when institutional development
lags behind the pace of individual acculturation the grounds
are created for serious frustrations.
This connection between principle and observable conditions
in transitional societies points out that one common cause of
their political instability is the widespread personal and
individual instability which inevitably results from frustration.
But we must look deeper than that--and into the more funda-
mental matter of the operation of the society of which the
frustrated individual is a member. It is the over-all workings
of the society which condition his responses and which are
responsible for the discontinuity of change.
When we look beyond the individual we see that most
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transitional societies lack two of the essential prerequisites
for a stable system of representative government. The first
of these is a social mechanism whereby it becomes possible
to determine and clarify continuously the pattern of values
and interests within the society and relate these to the
pattern of power through an aggregating and bargaining process.
The second is the availability of appropriate instruments
for carrying out public policy once the society has expressed
its relative values and interests--that is, an efficient
bureaucracy which is not just one of the dominant political
groupings in the society. The lack of these in transitional
societies constitutes a basic weakness.
Under these conditions it is, of course, possible for
the society to avoid excessive tensions if those who have
political aspirations can be recruited into the elite society
and accept its outlook. Indeed, some such form of political
tutelage is essential if a traditional society is to adopt
a more modern form of political life. The danger, however,
always exists that the current elite will strive to maintain
its administrative and political monopoly and not permit the
development of the autonomous roles of the administrator and
the politician. When this occurs there is a rise in authori-
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tarianism which is reinforced by the fact that the elite is
becoming even more isolated from the masses.
The failure of most transitional societies to develop
those who can skillfully articulate the values of the popu-
lation creates other dangers. Even when advancing programs
that conform to the broad aspirations of the population,
no government can harness the energies of the people unless
there is genuine communication between the decision-makers
and the population. Where there is no articulation of the
values of the population, the administrators can at best
stimulate only a synthetic enthusiasm in the nature of the
response common to public relations efforts. If the public
is to be identified with the programs of the administrators
the people must have a sense of participation in the making
of the decisions which most directly affect them. Although
the elite can assume the initiative and dominate the communi-
cation system, some mechanisms for determining and expressing
mass attitudes are essential if the energies of the society
are to be effectively mobilized.
The lack of those who can perform the full role of the
politician is also a major reason why the gap between aspiration
and reality becomes a source of general frustration in many
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transitional societies. An important but often overlooked
function of open and competitive political articulation is
that of creating in the minds of the public a better appreci-
ation of the distinction between the plausible and the possible.
In societies experiencing rapid cultural change people
are often just beginning to learn that they can change their
condition of life through political effort. However, in
their enthusiastic responses to the power of idealism they
are likely to be slow in developing a new and appropriate
sense of realism. Also, since people engrossed in the prob-
lems of acculturation tend to stress the forms or styles of
behavior and become in a sense fad-oriented, their behavior
is guided by their images of an ultimately desired way of
life and not by the realities of the existing situation.
Once such people feel that it is no longer appropriate to
be restrained by the essentially cautious and shrewd outlook
on life common to traditional and peasant societies, they are
likely to find it difficult to determine what should be the
new and realistic standards for guiding their behavior.
In transitional societies large politically significant
elements of the population feel that they can expect a new
relationship to exist between effort and reward but are still
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unsure as to what this relationship actually is. Their poli-
tical behavior tends toward the extremes of either believing
in pie-in-the-sky promises or distrusting completely the
words of the politician. It is here that the role of the
articulating and competing politicians become important,
since it is through exposure to their messages that a public
can develop a sense of political realism without losing an
appreciation for the appropriate function of idealism. In
time the public can learn that in listening to political
discourse it is necessary to discriminate between the exaggerated
language that constitutes the wrappings of political promises
and the actual policy implications that are partially hidden
within the messages. It is this function of open and even
exaggerated political debate in creating a more sophisticated
public which can ignore the wild promises of political ex-
tremists that led the philosopher T.V. Smith to say "They
also serve who only articulate." Once a public feels rightly
or wrongly that it knows as much as its politicians, if not
more, one of the necessary conditions for totalitarian move-
ments is removed.
To sumarize and to return to our attempt to identify
the central cause of political instability in transitional
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societies, we would point to the lack of an effective
relationship between the ruling elites and their peoples.
We see that in some instances political instability is
directly connected with the fact that sudden and sharp changes
in intra-elite relations are possible because the key members
of the elite do not have any firm commitments to the interests
of particualr segments of the public; and since the members of
the elite are not securely anchored to the interests and
points of view of a constituency, they are free to act
according to their personal interpretations of what is
advantageous in the limited sphere of intra-elite relations.
Consequently their behavior often tends to be essentially op-
portunistic. We see that in other instances the elite
may remain united but project to the public only its own
views of what is socially and politically desirable. Even
though they may believe themselves to be sympathetic to the
aspirations of the people they may be in fact isolated in
their own world. It is clear that when for any reason there
is a gap between elite and public there is both opportunity
and temptation for any set of would-be leaders, with or
without valid qualifications, to attempt to fill it--a
situation almost inevitably fatal to hopes for political
stability.
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Democracy and the Fusion of the Universal and the Parochial
We may return now to our original questions about
the applicability of Western institutions, and particularly
of democratic practices, for the process of nation building
in the new states. It should be apparent from our
analysis that we are dealing with a problem that is on the.
one hand deeply grounded in the context of our particular
period of history, but which on the other hand is of
such tremendous significance for the development of world
history that it does seem to constitute a universal problem
that is above all particularistic considerations of time
and place.
The fundamental problem of nation building at this
stage of history in most of the new states is that of
finding a satisfactory reconciliation between the universal-
istic dimensions of the world culture and the parochial
expressions of the local culture. A modern nation state
represents not only the political applications of all the
technologies, the attitudes and knowledge basic to what
we have called the world culture, but also a unique ex-
pression of the local and special interests of a distinctive
community of people. The test of nation building in the
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new states is the search for a new sense of collective
identity for an entire people--a sense of identity which
will be built around a command of all the potentialities
inherent in the universal and cosmopolitan culture of the
modern world, and a full expression of self-respect for
all that is distinctive in one's own heritage.
During the first stages when the world culture is
being introduced into a transitional society, the process
can be greatly facilitated by the application of authori-
tative means. Indeed, it is possible to establish much of
the infrastructure of a modern state through such imposed
methods. This of course is a function which colonialism
performed in many of the new states. The very limitations
of colonialism however point to the limitations of authori-
tarian methods in the building of modern states.
At a second stage the need is for bringing together
the universal and the parochial. It is at this stage that
there must be a more intimate relationship between the govern-
ment and the masses. This is the ddicate stage when the
particularistic sentiments and the real interests of the
people must be brought into the political process without
disrupting the requirements of the state apparatus. The
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merging of the cosmopolitan and the parochial can appear to
be done through populist movements and enunciation of
nationalist ideologies, but in the main these turn out to
be synthetic attempts. For only very rarely in human history
has it been possible for a creative individual to give
expression to the sense of identity of an entire people.
Under conditions of rapid social change this is particularly
difficult.
The attempts of African leaders to give expression
to the "soul of Africa," to find the "African personality,"
and to identify themselves with the "spirit of Pan-Africanism"
reflects this urgent need to bring together the universal
and the parochial. Yet often these attempts seem to fail
in giving a genuine sense of identity to the emerging
polity because what is claimed to be the parochial does
not in fact represent specific and concrete interests
within the society.
It is at this point that the basic functions of
representative government become critical in the nation
building process. If these new societies are going to
achieve a new level of integration they must find methods
for giving representation to both cosmopolitan and parochial
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forces. Out of the interplay of representative politics
it is possible for a society to realize a fundamental
fusion of elements of the world culture and the indigenous
traditions. This process of blending lies at the heart
of the modernization process; and it is this fact which
justifies our faith that there is a close association
between democratization and modernization.
